The Photograph that Built Modern Copyright Law: Why Burrow-Giles v. Sarony Still Matters in the Age of AI

How an 1884 Supreme Court Case About Photography Still Shapes Copyright Authorship and AI-Generated Works Today

Can a machine’s output ever belong to a person?
That question sounds like it belongs in a headline about artificial intelligence. In fact, it is nearly a century and a half old and was first answered by the United States Supreme Court in a dispute over a portrait of Oscar Wilde in a velvet jacket.
The Dispute
In 1882, celebrity photographer Napoleon Sarony posed Oscar Wilde for a portrait he titled “Oscar Wilde, No. 18.”
Sarony was one of the most sought-after portrait photographers of the era, known for elaborately staging his celebrity subjects rather than simply pointing a camera and clicking the shutter.
For this sitting, he chose Wilde’s costume, arranged the velvet jacket, draperies, and stockings, positioned the pose, adjusted the lighting and shade, and suggested the exact expression he wanted before the picture was ever taken.¹
The Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company liked the image enough to reproduce it, without permission or payment, on approximately 85,000 advertising lithographs. Sarony sued for copyright infringement.
Burrow-Giles did not deny copying the image.
Instead, it argued that photographs could not be copyrighted at all.
A photograph, the company argued, was nothing more than a mechanical trace left by light hitting a chemically treated plate. The camera, not the person standing behind it, did the actual work.
If a machine produced the image, Burrow-Giles reasoned, there was no human “author,” and without a human author, the Constitution’s Copyright Clause did not apply.
It was a bold argument, and if it had prevailed, photography could have been left outside the protection of copyright law.
What Did the Supreme Court Decide?
The Supreme Court disagreed.
Its decision in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), became one of the foundational decisions in the history of copyright law.²
Justice Samuel Miller, writing for the Court, acknowledged the mechanical nature of photography but focused on a different question: whether the photograph reflected the original intellectual conception of a human author.
The trial court had found that Sarony created the photograph “entirely from his own original mental conception” through his decisions regarding Wilde’s pose, costume, draperies, lighting, shade, arrangement, and expression.
Because Sarony’s creative decisions, rather than simply the mechanical operation of the camera, gave the photograph its particular character, the Supreme Court held that Sarony was its author and that the photograph could qualify as a protected “writing” within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Court did leave open a narrower possibility.
It declined to decide whether an ordinary photograph produced as a purely mechanical reproduction, without originality, intellectual production, thought, or conception by an author, would qualify for copyright protection.³
But on the facts before it, Sarony’s creative control settled the question.
Why Burrow-Giles Still Matters Today
For much of the twentieth century, Burrow-Giles could be understood primarily as the case confirming that photographs may receive copyright protection.
But the principle behind the decision has become increasingly important in the age of artificial intelligence:
Look beyond the machine and ask what human creative choices shaped the work.
That question closely resembles the issue copyright authorities now face when considering AI-generated images, writing, music, and other creative material.
In January 2025, the U.S. Copyright Office released Part 2 of its Copyright and Artificial Intelligence Report, addressing the copyrightability of generative AI outputs.
The Copyright Office concluded that AI-assisted works may qualify for copyright where a human author determines sufficient expressive elements. It also concluded that purely AI-generated material, or material involving insufficient human control over the expressive elements, is not protected. Based on current generally available technology, prompts alone generally do not provide sufficient control.⁴
Human selection, coordination, arrangement, or creative modification of AI-generated material may still qualify for protection.
From the Camera to Artificial Intelligence
The connection becomes even clearer in Thaler v. Perlmutter.
Computer scientist Stephen Thaler sought copyright registration for an image generated by his artificial intelligence system, identifying the AI system itself as the author.
In March 2025, the D.C. Circuit held that the Copyright Act requires a human author and rejected the claim for registration of a work generated without human authorship.⁵
The Supreme Court later declined to review the case on March 2, 2026, leaving the D.C. Circuit's ruling in place.
Although Thaler rested on the text of the modern Copyright Act rather than directly on Burrow-Giles, the basic idea is strikingly familiar.
The machine may be sophisticated, but copyright still asks where the human authorship lies.
Patent Law Has Faced a Similar Question
Patent law has confronted its own version of the human-creation requirement.
In Thaler v. Vidal, Stephen Thaler sought patent protection for inventions attributed solely to an AI system known as DABUS.
The Federal Circuit held that the Patent Act requires an inventor to be a natural person.⁶
The court reached that result through statutory interpretation rather than copyright doctrine.
Still, the parallel is notable.
Both copyright and patent law have confronted the question of whether machines themselves can occupy legal roles historically assigned to human creators or inventors.
So far, the answer under current federal law has been no.
Creative Control Matters More Than the Tool
Burrow-Giles also helps explain why using technology does not automatically prevent a human creator from receiving copyright protection.
The important distinction is between using a machine as a tool and allowing the machine to determine the expressive result without sufficient human control.
That principle appears in later copyright cases.
In Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, a documentary filmmaker alleged that he designed the shots, lighting, camera angles, and sequences used to capture underwater footage of the Titanic wreck, even though he never physically operated the underwater cameras.
The court refused to dismiss his authorship claim, emphasizing his alleged creative control over the resulting footage.⁷
The same idea appears from the opposite direction in Naruto v. Slater, where the Ninth Circuit held that a crested macaque that took photographs using a wildlife photographer's camera could not maintain a copyright infringement action under the Copyright Act.⁸
The common thread is not the complexity of the equipment.
It is the presence, or absence, of legally recognized human authorship.
Why This Matters for Creators and Businesses Using AI
Generative AI makes the distinction between human creativity and machine production increasingly important.
Photographers, artists, designers, software developers, agencies, and businesses may use AI tools at different stages of the creative process.
In some situations, AI may function primarily as an assistive tool within a larger human-directed work.
In others, the system may generate most or all of the expressive content with relatively little human control over the specific result.
Those differences can matter when determining what portions of a work are eligible for copyright protection.
The Copyright Office has made clear that the analysis is fact-specific. The relevant question is not simply whether AI was used.
The question is what expressive elements were actually created or controlled by a human author.
For businesses relying on AI-generated content, that can affect copyright registration, licensing, ownership, enforcement, and the value of the resulting intellectual property.
Conclusion
Burrow-Giles offers something unusual in copyright law: a principle flexible enough to remain relevant long after the technology that produced the original dispute became ordinary.
In 1884, the technology was photography. Today, it is generative artificial intelligence.
The tools have changed dramatically, but the central question remains remarkably similar:
Is the final work the product of human creative conception, or merely the output of a machine?
For Sarony, the answer was clear. The camera mechanically captured the image, but his choices shaped the photograph.
As AI becomes more deeply integrated into creative industries, the distinction between human direction and machine generation will continue to affect what can be protected, registered, licensed, and enforced.
Nearly 150 years later, Burrow-Giles still reminds us that copyright is concerned not simply with the tool that produces a work, but with the human creativity behind it.
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About the Author
Erin Briley Carlin is a legal intern at Rotek Law and a J.D. candidate at St. Thomas University College of Law, pursuing a certificate in Intellectual Property Law. She assists with legal research and intellectual property matters while contributing to the firm's marketing and business development initiatives.
Authorities Cited
[1] Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
[2] Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Full Opinion, U.S. Government Publishing Office Download the Official PDF
[3] Id. at 59.
[4] U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability (Jan. 29, 2025). Read the U.S. Copyright Office Report
[5] Thaler v. Perlmutter, 130 F.4th 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-449 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026). View the Supreme Court Docket
[6] Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Read the Federal Circuit Case
[7] Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
[8] Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
Disclaimer
This article is provided for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Copyright protection for AI-assisted and other creative works depends on the particular human contributions, the nature of the work, the technology involved, and applicable law. Reading this article or contacting Rotek Law does not create an attorney-client relationship. Readers should consult a qualified attorney regarding their specific circumstances.



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